Diplomacy and Politics: The 2025 Iran-US Negotiations

- Sanskruti Aparajit

B.A.LL.B, D.E.S Navalmal Firodia Law College, Pune

Introduction

Iran’s nuclear capabilities have been an issue of contention for more than 2 decades now. In a world where having nuclear weapons is almost like sitting at the highest table of power and authority, this dream for Iran is yet to become a reality, entangled in the webs of never-ending diplomacy, sanctions, and years of defiance. Today, there are nine nuclear-armed states worldwide, namely the US, Russia, the UK, France, China, India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel. According to the Federation of American Scientists, these nine states possess more than 12,500 nuclear warheads combined – 88% of which are in the arsenals of the US and Russia, with thousands ready to be launched on short notice. At times like this, the blatant refusal to let Iran also have nuclear weapons may seem arbitrary to anyone unaware of the political and historical context around Iran, West Asia, and the United States. As of April 2025, Iran and the US are in intense negotiations over the nuclear deal they signed in 2015 called the JCPOA, i.e the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Iran had earlier signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), 1968, which aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy and disarmament. It was signed by 59 countries around the world, including North Korea (one of the current nuclear states), which withdrew from the treaty. India, Israel, and Pakistan never signed this treaty. The treaty came into force in 1970, but by 1979, due to the overthrow of the Pahlavi dynasty, Iran secretly started pursuing nuclear technology.

As a result, in 2015, the Obama administration signed the JCPOA with Iran. However, the US withdrew from this deal under the leadership of President Donald Trump on May 8, 2018 and reimposed the suspended sanctions on Iran. As of April 2025, Iran is back to negotiating with the newly formed Trump Administration to work towards its nuclear programs.

The 2015 Nuclear Deal

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was signed in 2015 by Iran and several world powers, including the five permanent members of the United Nations’ Security Council (the UK, France, Russia, China, and the US), Germany (collectively known as the P5+1), and the European Union. The JCPOA deal aimed to dismantle Iran from its nuclear program and open its nuclear facilities to international inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in exchange for lifting the strict nuclear-related sanctions on Iran that were damaging its economy. In 2011, Iran's nominal GDP was USD 583.5 billion, and the stock market capitalisation to GDP ratio stood at 16.40 percent. Between 2011 and 2015, imposed sanctions resulted in a nominal GDP level of USD 385.9, a cumulative contraction of over 33 percent. The market capitalisation to GDP ratio, by the end of 2015, then rose to 25.40 percent.

Under the deal, Iran had agreed to some restrictions on its ongoing nuclear program. In July 2015, Iran had two uranium enrichment plants - Natanz and Fordo - and was operating almost 20,000 centrifuges. Iran was limited to installing no more than 5,060 of the oldest and least efficient centrifuges at Natanz until 2026, and the stockpile of enriched uranium was also reduced by 98% to 300kg (660 lbs), which was not to be exceeded until 2031. Iran was also required to maintain its stockpile's level of Uranium enrichment at 3.67%. Low-enriched uranium, which typically has a 3-5% concentration of U-235, is used to produce fuel for commercial nuclear power plants. Highly enriched uranium, which has a purity of 20% or more, is typically used in research reactors, while weapon-grade uranium is 90% enriched and above.

Further, no enrichment was permitted at its facility at Fordo until 2031, and the underground facility must be converted into a nuclear physics and technology centre. Additionally, research and development were permitted to take place only at Natanz and were limited until 2024. Iran was also restricted from any weapon-grade plutonium and to not building any heavy water reactors to store heavy water until 2031.

The second major imposition of the deal was constant monitoring by the IAEA, i.e the International Atomic Energy Agency. The IAEA was tasked to monitor the nuclear sites across Iran (the Natanz and Fordow enrichment plants, the Bushehr power plant, and the Arak heavy water reactor) and verify that no fissile material is moved to a secret location to build any nuclear weapon. Iran also agreed to implement the Additional Protocol to their IAEA Safeguards Agreement, which allowed the inspectors to access any site anywhere in the country they considered suspicious.

US’s Interest in the deal

The Obama administration was confident that the JCOPA was eliminating key elements required by Iran to make nuclear weapons, which, as per them, could have been made in three to four months back in 2015. It was claimed that before July 2015, Iran had enough enriched uranium and centrifuges to create eight to 10 bombs. So, the deal was also delaying the breakout time, i.e time it would take for Iran to get enough fissile material to build a nuclear weapon, to one year or more. Keeping a cap limit on Iran’s enrichment levels and delaying the development was a strategic move made at the time in response to the limited time the US administration had in 2015. Because a nuclear armed Iran would have created a domino effect in the Middle East, with its rival counterparts, i.e, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt also pursuing nuclear weapons.

A nuclear-armed Iran would also become an immediate threat to Israel, an ally of the US, as there are no formal diplomatic relations between Iran and Israel, and the relations are rather hostile since the Gulf War in 1991 and Iran’s public objection to Israel's bombardment of Gaza. Hence, American allies could seriously be threatened by Iran’s nuclear development, which could negatively impact American ties and policies in return. Finally, allowing Iran to pursue their nuclear program would also mean undermining the decades of non-proliferation efforts made globally by superpowers and may also weaken the US’ stance on peaceful nuclear cooperation and security.

Trump’s Withdrawal and the War in June

Trump’s reasons for withdrawing the JCPOA deal were simple. The Trump administration claimed that the deal was weak and temporary, to the bigger issue regarding Iran’s nuclear programs. The “Sunset Clause” in the deal gave Iran a clear pathway to nuclear weapons as the restrictions imposed on Iran ended between 2026 and 2031. So, the deal was merely postponing Iran’s inevitable nuclear development in the future. In addition to this, there was no constraint on Iran’s ballistic missile development and its proxy warfare in the Middle East, like Iran’s support to Syria’s Assad Dictatorship. As a result, the strict banking and oil sanctions were reimposed on Iran as a part of the “maximum pressure” campaign to compel Iran to comply and negotiate on the US’s terms. Iran is a major OPEC (The Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) member, the third largest oil producer behind Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Since the reimposition of oil sanctions, oil and petroleum products have accounted for 80% of Iran’s exports. And by 2020, exports of Iranian crude had fallen as low as one hundred thousand barrels per day. However, these exports rose again during the Biden administration at the end of 2022, which sought to revive the deal with Iran, but no agreement between the countries was made possible at the time.

In 2019, when the sanctions were tightened, Iran began breaching the deal, which resulted in Iran having a stockpile of enriched uranium that was many times larger than permitted, including at least 17.7kg (39lb) of material enriched to 60% purity by November 2021. But even until 2023, efforts were being made to reach a negotiation on the deal. Following the election of Donald Trump as the 47th President of the US in 2024, the Iran-US negotiations have taken a new angle. The Trump administration is very clear on its goal to prevent Iran from having any weapons that can pose a threat to its neighbouring states as well as global security. Recently, the Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, said that Iran’s uranium enrichment should be stopped entirely and the country should import its nuclear fuel instead and that the US will be involved in the inspection of its facilities around the country, including the military ones.

Iran insists that it can consider trading the nuclear curbs only on guaranteed sanction relief, as the economy is still severely threatened by the sanctions. President Donald Trump recently stated that any country purchasing oil from Iran can face secondary sanctions, hence putting more pressure on Iran. Iran’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmaeil Baghaei insisted that Iran is willing to reach a negotiation and insisted that Iran’s nuclear programme is purely for civilian purposes. The Trump administration had been positive that it would make a deal with Iran soon. The negotiations are still going on, having Oman as the mediator between the two countries. The sixth round of the talks was scheduled to be on 15th June, 2025, but Iran has announced its withdrawal from it following the Israeli attack on its facilities

Iran’s Internal Dynamics and Proxy Warfare

Beyond these negotiations, the nuclear deal talks are also heavily influenced by internal politics and regional tensions. In Iran, the ultimate power to shape and direct the foreign policy is in the hands of the supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, who is a theocratic conservative. And the newly elected president, Masoud Pezeshkian, is a moderate reformist who takes a different approach against the theocratic conservatives. The hardliners favour resistance and proxy warfare against the US and Israel, whereas the moderate reformists push for relief through diplomacy. Additionally, the hardliners control key institutions like the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), judiciary, state media and the parliament. Pezeshkian, on the other hand, has hinted at openness to re-engagements. Despite these different approaches, both factions agree on maintaining enrichment capacity and pursuing regional deterrence. This internal unity on the matter of Iran’s enrichment makes it tricky for the US to reach a favourable deal. Khamenei also has the final say on any deal in Iran, and so even when the moderates use diplomacy and negotiations, the hardliners will continue to make use of Iran’s proxy posture to put pressure on the West, hoping it strengthens their position to ease the sanctions.

Iran’s use of proxies throughout the Middle East is also a point of contention in these nuclear talks. The Houthi rebels in Yemen, Hezbollah in Lebanon and Syria, and other Iraqi and Syrian militias are just some of Iran’s regional proxies that have influenced Israeli and American security concerns. The Houthis have frequently launched drones and missiles to attack American ships, which were halted in May 2025 by a ceasefire mediated by Oman, ahead of the nuclear negotiations. Some experts believe Tehran strategically adjust proxy warfare to keep its fundamental policies unaltered while acting in diplomacy. The US has declared the Houthis to be a terrorist organisation, with Secretary Marko Rubio warning these groups that the US will not tolerate any threat to the security of American civilians and personnel in the Middle East and their regional partners. It is clear that the US wants to address Iran’s regional activities in the deal too, alongside the nuclear enrichment compromise.

Global Implications of a Deal

A new deal between Iran and the US would reinforce the NPT framework by capping Iran’s enrichment and extending the US’s monitoring. This will have global implications, such as security in the Middle East, oil trade around the world, etc. Reducing the sanctions on Iran will help with the global shortage of supply of oil, considering that the oil flows from the Al Basrah Oil Terminal in the Persian Gulf are important to the global supply. According to Citi Research, negotiations may result in an additional 1-2 million barrels of Iranian crude per day, which would drive Brent prices down to about $50 to $5 per barrel. However, a military escalation or failure to negotiate an agreement could swiftly reverse the trend and drive prices above $70. The military tensions in the area pose a threat to any diplomatic attempts made by Iran or the US. Israel earlier had refused to rule out any attack on Iran’s facilities, maintaining that any negotiations between Iran and the US must also limit Tehran from developing ballistic missiles. In June 2025, Israel launched direct attacks on Iran’s facilities, killing top figures like the head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the head of Iran’s regular armed forces, and the chief of the IRGC Air Force. The negotiation talks are deemed meaningless after the attack, and Trump also feels “less confident” about securing a deal with Iran after the retaliation from Tehran. Iran has responded to Israel’s attack with ballistic missile attacks aimed at areas in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, resulting in significant damage and casualties. This has increased the tension between the two countries, and as long as these regional tensions continue and the proxies remain active, any agreement between the two sides remains uncertain.

The stakes are high for India, too. Iran was India’s top oil supplier prior to the US’s withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018, with Iran being the fourth largest supplier of oil to India in 2018-19, when India imported 23.5 million tonnes from Iran. With a new deal, India can resume supplying oil from Tehran and negotiate with Iran on its terms, which could potentially lower fuel prices in India and also its import prices. India has also invested heavily in Chabahar Port to maintain its influence in the region, but has received a significant setback due to the sanctions. India had to get a waiver for the Port in 2018, which was given to India after enough reluctance from Washington. A new deal will reduce the U.S. pressure, which will help accelerate the project, attract more private investment in the region, and increase cargo flow. Iran emphasises that deeper cooperation and proper flourishing of Chabahar can happen only through permanent relief from sanctions. Therefore, a new deal and cooperation between Iran and the US will positively impact India’s connectivity, trade, and relief from sanctions compliance. But as the tensions between Israel and Iran increase, India might also play a role in de-escalating the tensions so that an agreement between the US and Iran can be reached soon.

Conclusion

The 2025 rounds of negotiations between Iran and the US show the complexity of diplomacy, the promise of negotiation, the ongoing geopolitical tension, and the role of third parties. Iran, despite harsh sanctions, remains firm, knowing that sanctions relief will benefit everyone, including the US and India. The US, on the other hand, aims to put a cap on Iran’s enrichment as well as address its regional aggression and use of proxies. India has a significant interest in the sanction’s relief, especially regarding the Chabahar Port and reasonable oil imports from Iran. Israel is also playing an active role, taking an aggressive stance on the matter with direct action that complicates a peaceful agreement. Though no agreement has been reached so far, the world continues to watch, hoping for a decision that sets the course for future policies and trade with Iran.