- Mr. Bakshinder Singh Bhatia
Blog Analyst, SLRMS
On 24th June, US President Donald Trump announced a ceasefire between Iran and Israel, bringing the twelve-day war between the nations to a stop. The war started in the early hours of June 13 with Israel launching a successful surprise attack named Operation Rising Lion with decapitation strikes against senior IRGC officials and nuclear scientists. These strikes were accompanied by deployment of covert operational assets, including one-way attack drones, short-range propellant rockets and anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM’s) and explosives clandestinely smuggled into Iran for saboteur operations in the following days. This led to the systematic targeting of Iran’s air defence systems, incapacitating radars and missile batteries. The stated goal of the operation was the neutralisation of Iran’s latent nuclear capabilities in Natanz, Isfahan and Fordow uranium enrichment plants.
After recuperating its air defence system, Iran launched a retaliatory strike on Israel, named True Promise 3 (TP3), penetrating missile defence layers with a significant number of missiles targeting many high-value targets. This protracted war between both countries was followed by a direct US attack on Iran, claiming 'obliteration' of uranium enrichment power plants. Though media reports in Israel and the USA challenge the claims of destruction of nuclear sites, the attack gave enough manoeuvrability space to call for an “end to the mission” by the US President, claiming a ceasefire. US attacks were followed by Iranian retaliation strikes on the US Al-Ubeid base in Qatar with ballistic missiles without any critical damage, inferring both Iranians and Americans unwillingness to wage a total war of destruction on each other.
Even with the ceasefire, the existential nature of the conflict has not withered away, and the fundamental contradictions between the warring parties remain. One of the overlooked factors in the US, Israel, and Iran tango has been Russia's balancing act on its southern underbelly. In his meeting with Iranian foreign minister Abbas Araghchi since the ceasefire, Russian President Vladimir Putin described the US airstrikes on Iranian Uranium enrichment facilities as "unprovoked" and "unjustifiable aggression". Importantly, along with the Russian President, foreign minister Sergei Lavrov and Yuri Ushakov, advisor to the president of Russia on Foreign policy, the closed-door meeting was attended by vice-Admiral Igor Kostyukov, head of the intelligence directorate of Russia’s General Staff, implying both sides having significant military discussions in line with the strategic cooperation partnership signed between Russia and Iran in January 2025.
Consequently, Araghchi landed in Turkmenistan before returning to Tehran, acknowledging the critical importance of the Caspian Sea region for maritime connectivity between Iran and Russia. The Turkmenbashi port in Turkmenistan has been the main loading and unloading point for Russia's supply to Iran, and the country has been the end point of rail shipments of cargo and arms from China and North Korea.
Additionally, though Russia has been a strict adherent of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, vis-à-vis Iran, direct attacks from the USA on Iranian enrichment sites and implied intent at regime change have rendered earlier affirmations flexible. Dmitry Medvedev, deputy chairman of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, remarked in his 10-point Telegram post about the potential emergence of an ultra-nationalistic nuclear weapon state. Making a radical departure, this was the first statement from a senior Russian official about the possible “nuclearisation" of Iran in the face of existential threats from the US and Israel, revealing a public surfacing of varied assessments in the Russian political and military circles due to US, Israeli attacks on Iran.
Though Russia and Iran have tried to develop strong defence relations in recent years, their partnership still faces many challenges. According to media reports, Iranian Defence Minister Aziz Nazirzadeh initiated the procurement of Chengdu J-10C fighter jets and advanced AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) equipment from China at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) defence ministers meeting. Russia’s inability to provide two dozen SU-35s to Iran, even after securing a deal in 2023, made Tehran reorient its defence strategy away from Moscow. Even their security interests in the region often conflict with each other. Russia's unwillingness to operate its air defence systems in Syria against Israeli air strikes led to the gradual withering away of state military capabilities. This policy of passiveness and non-engagement by Russia was seen in Iran as a tacit encouragement for Israel to bomb Syrian lands, eventually leading to the loss of diligently cultivated strategic depth over the years in the region.
Moreover, the intricate nature of the treaty text between Russia and Iran gives enough space for subjective interpretations to both countries. Firstly, the terms “war,” “armed invasion”, and “attack” are not mentioned in the treaty, while the term “cooperation” appears seventy-one times in the treaty text. This is a sharp contrast to Russia's treaty on comprehensive strategic partnership with North Korea, which explicitly states to provide "military and other assistance with all means in the possession without delay" in a state of war. Secondly, Article 3(3) and 3(4) of the treaty text painstakingly mention that both sides should not help the other side's adversary in a conflict situation and should not permit their territories to support a hostile action against each other. Thirdly, the Iranian government has been cautious of historical mutual suspicion and overreach by Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union on their northern territories in the past, making the dictum of strategic independence a central point in the foreign policy discourse. Although the late Iranian president Ibrahim Raisi titled with his "look east policy", his successor, President Masoud Prezeshkian, belonging to the reformist camp, had shown his keenness to develop trade relations with the west, and lifting of the sanctions. Lastly, there are around two million Russian-speaking people in Israel, forming 15% the total population, which gives a vigorous undercurrent to Russian-Israeli bilateral relations and Putin’s personal Philosemitism.
The heart of the matter is that further US actions in the region will force operational and strategic changes in the Russian-Ukrainian battlespace. The pace of the Russian westward offensive in Ukraine was tempered by Putin’s calculation of negotiating a deal directly with US President Donald Trump, something which the previous US administrations had been unwilling to do. Meanwhile, as both Iran and Israel rearm and regroup, bypassing an already crumbling ceasefire, it remains to be seen how much more wiggle room Russia has left for its balancing act between two eschatological nations engaged in an existential war with one another.